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the concept of good faith doubt.' It seems that an employer, faced with an
authorization card demand from a union which had lost an election during
the past year, would have an excellent basis for doubting that the union
actually represented a majority of employees. This principle has already
been recognized by the Board 7 and broad acceptance seems likely.
Lawrence D. Stuart, Jr.
Foreseeability as a Limiting Factor in
Applying Strict Products Liability
While taking the drug MER-29, John Cudmore noticed loss of hair
and flaking of skin. He ceased taking MER-29 and approximately four
months later began experiencing trouble with his vision. This was later
diagnosed as cataracts in both eyes. He brought suit against the manu-
facturer alleging negligence and breach of implied warranty. The defend-
ants alleged that Cudmore was one of a small class of persons, the existence
of which was not reasonably foreseeable, who might react abnormally and
adversely to the drug. Among other findings returned by the jury' were
determinations (1) that the plaintiff's cataracts were the result of an
"abreaction"' to MER-29 and (2) that while he was taking MER-29 the
state of medical knowledge was such that the defendant could not, in the
exercise of ordinary care, have anticipated that the drug might cause
cataracts. The plaintiff filed no motion to disregard any of the jury find-
ings and judgment was entered, based on the findings, that he take nothing
by his suit. On appeal the plaintiff contended that the trial court had erred
in including the element of foreseeability in special issues where the theory
of recovery was in strict products liability based on implied warranty.
Held, affirmed: A manufacturer should be held liable for injuries from his
product only when he ought reasonably to have foreseen such injury in
an appreciable number of persons. Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1003 (1967).
36 See notes 13 and 16 supra.
3 See Nalco Chem. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (1967).
'The jury also returned these findings: that the defendant was not negligent in failing to prop-
erly test MER-29 or in withholding information concerning the drug; that MER-29 was not a
proximate cause of plaintiff's cataracts or loss of hair; but that the drug was a proximate cause
of his flaking skin.
'The following definition of abreaction was submitted with the special issue:
Abreaction means an unusual reaction resulting from a person's unusual susceptibility
to the product in question; that is, such person's reaction is different in the presence
of the drug in question from that in the usual person. An abreaction is one which
could not have been reasonably foreseen in an appreciable class or number of potential
users prior to March 2, 1961. [The date Cudmore ceased taking MER-29.]
[Editor's Note: There is some confusion as to the meaning of this term. WEBSTER's NEw WORLD
DICTIONARY (1964) gives the following definition: "in psychoanalysis, the relieving of a repressed
emotion, as by talking about it." As used by the Texas courts it seems to be a hybrid composed of
the two words "abnormal" and "reaction."]
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I. ESTABLISHING THE MANUFACTURER'S RESPONSIBILITY
Strict products liability was first imposed in cases involving contami-
nated food, to protect the innocent consumer regardless of his ability to
prove negligence on the part of the processor.' In search of a legal theory
on which to base the new liability, the courts arrived at the idea of a
"warranty" running from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer.
The use of warranty as a theory for strict products liability is unfortunate,
because of the existence of the contractual form of warranty.
The result has been the use of an inapplicable term, involving overtones
of contract, to describe a development predicated solely on public policy.
Moreover, commingling of the two quite separate forms of recovery has
created inevitable confusion. On the one hand there is the implied con-
tractual warranty extending from the seller of a product to his buyer.'
Privity of contract between the parties is a necessary element. On the
other hand there is the hybrid, strict products liability form of implied
warranty with no requirement of privity. In Texas the latter form has
long been applied to manufacturers of products for human consumption,
and, more recently, to manufacturers of defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous non-food products."
Historically, strict liability in Texas stems from the landmark case of
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,' a case involving injuries resulting from
contaminated sausage. There the Texas Supreme Court held that in adul-
terated food cases "the broad principle of the public policy to protect life
and health"9 favors "an implied warranty imposed by operation of law."'"
The court distinguished the new implied warranty from the contractual
type of warranty by stating, "while a right of action in such a case is
said to spring from a 'warranty' it should be noted that the warranty here
referred to is not . . .contractual warranty, but is an obligation imposed
'See Parks v. C.C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202 (1914); Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135
P. 633 (1913).
4 This idea first appeared in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305
(1927). It is now generally agreed that the warranty is made directly to the consumer. B.F. Good-
rich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d
317 (1953); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952);
Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936);
Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958); Jacob E. Decker
& Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
'Cruz v. Ansul Chem. Co., 399 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.; Brown v.
Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; Donelson v. Fairmont Foods Co.,
252 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Baylor v. Eastern Seed Co., 191 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946).
'See Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952); Griggs Canning Co.
v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Brumit v. Cokins, 281 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.;
Amarilo Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Loudder, 207 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Burgess, 195 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Enas,
164 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.
'See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Shamrock Fuel & Oil
Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
i1d. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
10 id.
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by law to protect public health."11 Texas courts of civil appeals followed
Decker in subsequent contaminated food cases,12 but were reluctant to
extend strict liability to manufacturers of non-food products.1" In Putman
v. Erie City Mfg. Co. 4 the Fifth Circuit made an "Erie-educated guess"
that the Texas Supreme Court would so extend the rule when the proper
case came before it. As was predicted by the Fifth Circuit, the Texas
Supreme Court recently extended the applicability of Decker to non-food
products."
II. EXTENT OF STRICT LIABILITY: FORESEEABILITY
A manufacturer's responsibility generally does not extend to all con-
sequences to which his product contributed, 0 but neither the courts nor
legal writers have agreed upon definite limits. 7 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts states the requirement that the product be "in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous" to the user for strict liability to be imposed.
111d. at 616, 164 S.W.2d at 831.
" See cases cited note 6 supra.
1""We feel unauthorized on the basis of the Decker case to recognize a further exception to
the general rule and impose liability in this case absent privity of contract." Cruz v. Ansul Chem.
Co., 399 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (fire extinguisher). See also
Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e. (cattle spray); An-
heuser-Busch, Inc. v. Butler, 180 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (exploding bottle); Latham
V. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 175 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (exploding bottle); Jax Beer
Co. v. Shaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m. (exploding bottle).
14338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964), discussed in 19 Sw. L.J. 198 (1965).
Is See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (permanent wave lotion);
Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967) (highly flammable kerosene).
1" Strict products liability is strict in the sense that privity of contract is not required and that
negligence on the part of the manufacturer is not a prerequisite for recovery, but, as stated in
Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 36 (5th Cir. 1963), "it is reasonable to draw a
line somewhere: a manufacturer of food products is not like one who keeps a tiger for a pet in
a crowded city."
'
7 Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
865 (1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963); Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Connolly, The
Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent in His Product, 32 INS. COUNSEL
J. 303 (1965); Cruse, Products Liability-Past, Present and Future, 8 So. TEXAS L.J. 151
(1966); James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections On Enterprise
Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550 (1966); Keaton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault
and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963); Morris, Enterprise Liability and
the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961); Comment,
Cigarettes and Vaccine; Unforeseeable Risk in Manufacturers Liability Under Implied Warranty,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 515 (1963). This lack of agreement may be due to rapid changes that have
taken place in the field of products liability or to the vague but flexible basis for strict liability,
which is public policy. That changes in the area have been rapid is pointed out in Wade, Strict
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 7 & n.17 (1965):
This [change in the area of products liability] is dramatically illustrated by the ex-
perience of the American Law Institute with the Restatement of Torts (Second).
As originally submitted by the Reporter (William L. Prosser), it contained a new
section which provided for strict liability of sellers of 'food for human consumption,'
with a caveat for other products. Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1961). Developments had progressed so rapidly, however, that it was decided
to include also 'products for intimate bodily use,' and this was approved by the In-
stitute in 1962. See id. (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). Two years later, however, de-
velopments had proceeded so far that the Reporter offered and the Institute approved
a new version applying to 'any product.' See id. (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
s In explaining the "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" phraseology, the comments
following § 402A seem to reflect a requirement of foreseeability. Comment h states that "[a]
product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption."
Comment j states that in order to keep a product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller
must warn of dangers to which a "substantial number of the population" are susceptible, "if he
has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have
knowledge of the presence of the ingredient and the danger."
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In delineating the extent of liability, foreseeability of harm has, in some
cases, been utilized as a limiting factor for strict products liability.'9 Never-
theless, cases involving contaminated food are often cited to indicate that
foreseeability is never a necessary element of the plaintiff's prima facie
case in strict liability. In such cases, however, the injurious result would
nearly always be obvious if the defect were known"-anyone would ex-
pect harm from the consumption of a soft drink containing the decom-
posed carcass of a mouse. Moreover, although concerning foreseeability of
defect rather than foreseeability of harm, the opinion of the sharply-
divided Texas Supreme Court in Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines2 recog-
nized some need for foreseeability even where contaminated food is in-
volved. The court held that the wholesaler was not strictly liable for
injuries resulting from wire in a cookie because packaging made discovery
of the defect impossible. While this reasoning would, of course, not ab-
solve a manufacturer, the court indicated in dictum that it would apply
the same doctrine in the case of a retailer."
In the case of a manufacturer, foreseeability has been expressly recog-
nized as a limiting factor in two classes of situations in which a non-
contaminated product is involved. First, where an idiosyncrasy or an
allergy is at issue the plaintiff is often required to prove that he is one
of a class of persons who might have been foreseen as adversely susceptible
to the product.' Second, the injury may be of a type that could not have
been foreseen in any user due to the existing state of scientific or medical
knowledge-the "unknowable risk."'
III. CUDMORE v. RICHARDSON-MIERRELL, INC.
Cudmore is important not merely for the result under the present facts
" See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 865 (1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963); Bowman Bis-
cuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
"
0 See, e.g., Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 632-34, 164 S.W.2d 835, 839, 840
(1942) in which the Texas Supreme Court held a retailer of a can of contaminated spinach liable
irrespective of whether he knew or could possibly have discovered the defect: "[W]e think the rule
which would exempt him from liability merely because he has no means of knowing whether the
contents of the sealed cans are unfit for human consumption is unsound in principle." Id. at 632,
164 S.W.2d at 839. "[W]e hold that a retailer who sells unwholesome food for human consumption
is liable to the consumer for the consequences under an implied warranty imposed by law as a mat-
ter of public policy, even though .. . the retailer has no means of knowing that the contents are
unfit for human consumption." Id. at 634, 164 S.W.2d at 840.
"See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 28.22, at 1584-85 (1956):
Food sold for immediate consumption is warranted as fit for consumption by ordinar-
ily healthy and normal people under ordinary circumstances. This means that it is
not contaminated and that it is free from impurities that might foreseeably prove
injurious, such as pebbles, glass or mice. (Emphasis added.)
25151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
2 Id.
"' See, e.g., Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956) ("reasonable [sic]
foreseeable idiosyncracies"); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ("substantial portion of possible users"); Howard v. Avon Prods.
Inc., 395 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1964) ("reasonably foreseeable class of potential users"); Crotty v.
Shastenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960) ("appreciable number");
Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963) ("reasonably foreseeable and
appreciable class of number of potential users").
25Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963). Contra, Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 154 So. 169 (Fla. 1963).
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and peculiar record, but to determine the effect of the holding on cases
which may arise in the future with different fact situations. Unfortunately,
the court did not clarify its position on foreseeability by indicating the
weight placed by it upon the various facts in the case. Thus, in an analysis
of the opinion, it is necessary to examine separately each fact apparently
considered by the court and to evaluate the effect of each, both upon the
holding and upon the applicability of foreseeability in each of the forms
that it has taken.
Purity. Early in the Cudmore opinion the court points out that the plain-
tiff's injuries resulted from usage of a pure product.' The court does not
suggest that the mere fact of purity absolves the manufacturer of re-
sponsibility for resulting injuries-the seller of pure cyanide as a cold
remedy would doubtless be liable for the consequences. The distinction
takes Cudmore out of the category of cases, such as those involving con-
taminated food, which seem to indicate that foreseeability of harm is not
a factor in strict liability. 7 And the distinction brings it within the two
classes of situations in which foreseeability has been expressly recognized
-cases involving allergies and those involving "unknowable risks." The
court apparently accepts the view that in adulterated food cases foresee-
ability of harm would be readily apparent if the condition of the product
were known and thus need not be proven in such cases."
Abreaction. Denial of liability seems to have been based primarily upon
the jury finding that the appellant's cataracts were the result of abreaction
to MER-29-"that appellant belongs to a class of people not appreciable
in number who are allergic to the drug."2 The court held that "in such
cases the manufacturer of a drug . . . should be liable on the grounds of
implied warranty for injurious results only when such results or similar
results ought reasonably to have been foreseen by a person of ordinary
care in an appreciable number of persons.""s The court gave no reasons for
this holding but cited numerous sister-state decisions, including Howard
v. Avon Products, Inc. 1 and Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co.3" In Howard, at
the time the plaintiff had purchased the defendant's product only one
person had sustained an adverse reaction, but a year after her purchase
some twelve other identifiable cases of reaction to the product arose. In
affirming a judgment for the defendant the Colorado Supreme Court stated,
"the implied warranty . . . attached at the time she purchased the jar of
'Strawberry Cooler' . . . and at that point in time there was no reasonably
foreseeable class of potential users who could be described as prone to suffer
from an allergic reaction to [the product]."" In Esborg, the Washington
28, This is not a case in which a foreign substance found its way into a bottled drink; it is
not a case involving spoiled food . 398 S.W.2d at 644.
27 See, e.g., note 20 supra.
21 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
2' 398 S.W.2d at 644.
a0 Id.
31 395 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1964).
aa 6 1 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963).
aa 3 9 5 P.2d at 1011.
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NOTES
Supreme Court placed a burden on the plaintiff, when confronted with
the defense of allergy or hypersensitivity, to produce "substantial evidence"
showing foreseeability of harm to an appreciable class of potential users."
The fact that the court in Cudmore emphasized the abreaction finding and
cited cases requiring a foreseeable class of susceptible users indicates that
the court considers such a foreseeable class a prerequisite for recovery in
any allergy case.
Unknowable Risk. Also among the cases cited by the court are those in
which strict liability was held inapplicable because the state of scientific
or medical knowledge was such that the harm was unforeseeable-the
"unknowable risk" cases. In these cases, Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co." and Ross v. Philip Morris &q Co.,3' the plaintiffs contracted lung
cancer after smoking cigarettes manufactured by the defendants and
brought implied warranty suits. In both cases the rulings were for the
tobacco companies because the state of medical or scientific knowledge
was not such that cancer could have been foreseen as a result of cigarette
smoking. In Ross the Eighth Circuit noted that a holding for the plaintiff,
"would have made defendant an absolute insurer-without regard to
'reasonableness' and without regard to 'developed human skill or fore-
sight."37 The Fifth Circuit in Lartigue discussed the extent of the manu-
facturer's responsibility for injuries resulting from his products: "He is an
insurer against foreseeable risks-but not against unknowable risks."3
Although primary emphasis seems to have been placed upon the abreac-
tion finding, the citation of unknowable risk holdings in a case in which
a finding was made that "the state of medical knowledge was not such
that the appellee could reasonably have discovered that MER-29 might
cause cataracts"'" would seem to indicate that the court might recognize
the "unknowable risk" limitation in a case in which a finding of allergy
was not also returned.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the events in Cudmore had taken place at a later time the result might
have been different. Facts now available, but not then before the Texas
court, include: a conviction of criminal fraud for withholding information
from the Food and Drug Administration;' the fact that as many as three
thousand users may have suffered various side reactions to MER-29 ;41 and
recent judgments against the manufacturer, based largely on fraud in
gaining FDA approval. Such facts have enabled other plaintiffs to recover
34 378 P.2d at 304.
a5 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
36 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
37 d. at 12.
3' 317 F.2d at 37.
3' 398 S.W.2d at 647.
40Flexman, MER/29 (Triparaonol) and Cataract, 1964 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 191.
41 See Hearings on Inter-Agency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation Before the
Subcomm. on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Comm. on Governmental Op-
erations, 88th Cong., 1st Seas., pt, 4, at 1955-78 (1963).
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